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Summary. We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies
Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a “cyclic permutation domain”
which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic
permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal domains on
which the Borda count is strategy-proof (when combined with every tie breaking rule).
It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger class of domains. We show
that the maximal domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity are
the “cyclically nested permutation domains.” These are the preference domains which
can be obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriate recursive way.
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1 Introduction
A social choice correspondence satisfies Maskin monotonicity if and only if a chosen
alternative remains a possible choice whenever in no individual’s ranking its relative
position to all other alternative decreases. It is well-known that Maskin monotonicity,
which we shall henceforth refer to simply as “monotonicity,” is a necessary condition for
Nash implementability; moreover, combined with a no veto power condition it is also
sufficient (Maskin (1999/1977)). In this paper, we characterize the preference domains
on which the Borda count satisfies monotonicity. Since the Borda count satisfies the
no veto power condition whenever there are sufficiently many voters, the result thereby
also yields the preference domains on which the Borda count is Nash implementable.
The celebrated Muller-Satterthwaite theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite (1977))
establishes that, for social choice functions (i.e. single-valued social choice correspon-
dences), monotonicity is equivalent to strategy-proofness, provided that all preference
profiles are admissible. By contrast, while strategy-proofness always implies monotonic-
ity, the converse need not be true on restricted domains. In fact, the main result of
the present paper provides an illustration of this, showing that there exist preference
domains on which the Borda count is monotonic but not strategy-proof when combined
with a tie breaking rule.
The preference domains on which the Borda count (with tie breaking) is strategy-
proof have been characterized in the companion paper Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di
(2006). There, we have shown that, if all individuals face the same domain restriction,
the maximal strategy-proof domains for the Borda count are obtained by fixing one
particular ordering of the alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. We
refer to such domains as cyclic permutation domains. Here, we show that monotonicity
of the Borda count imposes weaker restrictions and allows one to construct domains on
which possibility results emerge in a recursive way from the cyclic permutation domains.
The corresponding domains are referred to as cyclically nested permutation domains.
Specifically, we prove that, under a mild richness condition, the cyclically nested per-
mutation domains are exactly the domains on which the Borda count is monotonic,
maintaining the assumption that all individuals face the same domain restriction.
Cyclically nested permutation domains have a more complicated structure than the
cyclic permutation domains from which they are recursively constructed. This is the
price to be paid when moving from the stronger condition of strategy-proofness to
the less demanding condition of monotonicity. Note, however, that in the context of
the Borda count, monotonicity seems to be the more natural condition. Indeed, the
Borda count is naturally defined as a social choice correspondence while the definition of
strategy-proofness requires a social choice function. Thus, in order to analyze strategy-
proofness, the Borda count has first to be transformed into a social choice function using
a tie breaking rule.1
There is a large literature on domain restrictions in social choice (see Gaertner
(2001) for a recent state-of-the-art summary). Most contributions in this area, however,
have studied majority voting and its generalizations, taking Black’s (1948) seminal
contribution on the notion of single-peaked preferences as the starting point. Some
1In Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006), we show that in fact some results do depend on the way
ties are broken. Strictly speaking, the above mentioned characterization result asserts that the Borda
count combined with every tie breaking rule is strategy-proof if and only if the underlying domain is
a cyclic permutation domain.
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papers, such as Kalai and Muller (1977) and Kalai and Ritz (1980), have analyzed
abstract Arrovian aggregation on restricted domains and obtained characterizations of
those domains that admit possibility results.
The closest relative in the literature to the present paper is the work of Bochet and
Storcken (2005). To the best of our knowledge, this is the only other paper studying
Maskin monotonicity on restricted preference domains in the framework of the abstract
social choice model.2 These authors analyze both maximal strategy-proof and maxi-
mal monotonic domains for general social choice functions. However, unlike the present
paper in which every individual faces the same preference restriction, Bochet and Stor-
cken (2005) consider restrictions of the preference domain of exactly one individual.
By consequence, the social choice functions found to satisfy the desired properties of
strategy-proofness and monotonicity have a very special hierarchical structure and are
in fact “almost” dictatorial.
2 Basic Notation and Definitions
Let X be a finite universe of social states or social alternatives and q be its cardinality.
By PX , we denote the set of all linear orderings (irreflexive, transitive and total binary
relations) on X, and by P ⊆ PX a generic subdomain of the unrestricted domain PX .
Definition (Social choice rule) A mapping f :
⋃∞
n=1 Pn → 2X \ {∅} that assigns a
set of (most preferred) alternatives f(1, ...,n) ∈ 2X \ {∅} to each n-tuple of linear
orderings and all n is called a social choice rule (SCR).
Let rk[x,] denote the rank of alternative x in the ordering  (i.e. rk[x,] = 1 if x is
the top alternative in the ranking , rk[x,] = 2 if x is second-best, and so on).
Definition (Borda count) The SCR fB associated with the Borda count is given as
follows: for all n and all 1, . . . ,n∈ PX we have
x ∈ fB(1, . . . ,n)⇔
n∑
i=1
rk[x,i]) ≤
n∑
i=1
rk[y,i] for all y ∈ X.
We shall denote by L(x,) = {y ∈ X | x  y} the lower contour set and by U(x,) =
{y ∈ X | y  x} the upper contour set of a voter having preference  at the alternative
x ∈ X. A SCR f is called monotonic on P if for all x ∈ X, all n and all 1, . . . ,n,
′1 . . . ,′n∈ P we have
[x ∈ f(1, ...,n), L(x,i) ⊆ L(x,′i) for all i = 1, ..., n] ⇒ x ∈ f(′1, ...,′n).
We call a domain P Borda monotonic if fB is monotonic on P. Given a profile of
preferences (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn, we say that alternatives A ⊆ X are indifferent on the
top if A = fB(1, ...,n).
We will only be interested in preference domains that are minimally rich since on
2There is a distantly related literature on monotonic extensions of social choice rules. For instance,
the work of Erdem and Sanver (2005) is also motivated by the observation that the Borda count, and in
fact any scoring method, violates the monotonicity condition on an unrestricted domain. However, the
monotonic extensions are again defined on the unrestricted preference domain; therefore, the analysis
does not contribute to the question on which preference domains the original (non-extended) social
rule would satisfy monotonicity.
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“small” preference domains properties such as monotonicity or strategy-proofness can
be satisfied in a trivial way.3 Specifically, we will impose the following condition.
Definition (Rich domain) A domain P is called rich if, for any x ∈ X, there exists
(i) ∈ P such that rk[x,] = 1, and (ii) ′∈ P such that rk[x,′] = q.
Thus, our richness condition requires that each alternative must be (i) most preferred
by at least one preference ordering, and (ii) least preferred by some (other) preference
ordering. This is slightly stronger than the richness condition used in Barbie, Puppe
and Tasna´di (2006) which consisted of part (i) only. Part (ii) of the present condition
is needed in Lemma 3.3 and in Substep 2B of the proof of our main result below.
Cyclically nested permutation domains
An ordering ′ is called a cyclic permutation of  if ′ can be obtained from  by
sequentially shifting the bottom element to the top while leaving the order between
all other alternatives unchanged. Thus, for instance, the cyclic permutations of the
ordering abcd are dabc, cdab and bcda. The set of all cyclic permutations of a fixed
ordering  is denoted by Z(), which we also call a cyclic permutation domain. In
Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006), we have shown that the cyclic permutation domains
are exactly the domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof when combined
with any conceivable deterministic tie-breaking rule.4 The cyclic permutation domains
will be the building blocks of the Borda monotonic domains.
We will define the cyclically nested permutation (henceforth, CNP) domains recur-
sively. First, cyclic permutation domains are CNP domains of depth 1. Second, we
define CNP domains of depth 2. Assume that q = q1q2. We introduce the set of second
order pseudo alternatives X(2) = {X(2)1 , . . . , X(2)q2 }. Pick a preference (2)∈ PX(2) on
the set of second order pseudo alternatives and let us start with the pseudo domain
Z((2)). Next, we will replace each second order pseudo alternative X(2)i with a cycli-
cal permutation domain defined on the set of alternatives Xi with cardinality q1, where
X1, . . . , Xq2 is a partition of X. For instance, if q2 = 3 and q1 = 2, then first we obtain
the domain at the left hand side of Table 1 and thereafter the domain at the right hand
side of this table.
Table 1: Constructing CNP domains
(2)1 (2)2 (2)3
a1 a2 a3
a2 a3 a1
a3 a1 a2
1 2 3 4 5 6
b1 b2 c2 c1 d2 d1
b2 b1 c1 c2 d1 d2
c1 c2 d2 d1 b1 b2
c2 c1 d1 d2 b2 b1
d1 d2 b1 b2 c1 c2
d2 d1 b2 b1 c2 c1
3Obviously, every social choice function (i.e. single-valued social choice rule) is strategy-proof and
monotonic on any domain consisting of only one preference ordering.
4Combined with particular, appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules the Borda count can be
strategy-proof on a larger class of domains, see Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006).
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However, we must restrict the admissible replacements of pseudo alternatives. To
see this consider Table 2. Pick a profile Π consisting of one voter of each type. Then
fB(Π) = {b1, b2, c1, c2, d1, d2} and monotonicity is violated at alternative b2 if, for
instance, a voter of type 3 switches to type 6.
Table 2: A non-monotonic domain
1 2 3 4 5 6
b1 b2 c2 c1 d2 d1
b2 b1 c1 c2 d1 d2
c1 c2 d2 d1 b2 b1
c2 c1 d1 d2 b1 b2
d1 d2 b1 b2 c1 c2
d2 d1 b2 b1 c2 c1
We restrict the admissible replacements of second order pseudo alternatives by
cyclical permutation domains as follows. We have to specify those pairs of alternatives,
derived from different second order pseudo alternatives, that must maintain their rank
differences whenever they are ordered in the same way by two distinct preferences. We
can see, for example, in Table 1 that the rank differences between b1 and c1 are the same
in those preferences, which rank b1 higher than c1. We can observe similar relationships
between the following pairs of alternatives: (b1, d1), (b2, c2), (b2, d2), (c1, d1), (c1, b2),
(c2, d2), (c2, b1), (d1, b2), (d1, c2), (d2, b1) and (d2, c1). More generally, to define a CNP
domain we must also specify for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , q2}, i 6= j bijections ϕi,j : Xi → Xj
such that x and ϕi,j(x) maintain their rank differences for all x ∈ Xi whenever x is
ranked above ϕi,j(x).
Assume that we have already defined all CNP domains of depth n − 1 and that
q =
∏n
i=1 qi. Now we introduce the set of n
th order pseudo alternatives X(n) =
{X(n)1 , . . . , X(n)qn } to define CNP domains of depth n. Pick a preference (n)∈ PX(n)
on the set of nth order pseudo alternatives and we start with the pseudo domain
Z((n)). Then we replace for all i = 1, . . . , qn each instance of an nth order pseudo
alternative X(n)i with the same CNP domain of depth n−1, size q/qn and an associated
factorization q/qn =
∏n−1
i=1 qi. We shall denote byXi ⊆ X the set of alternatives derived
from the nth order pseudo alternativeX(n)i for any i = 1, . . . , qn. Note thatX1, . . . , Xqn
partitions X. Again, we restrict the admissible replacements of nth order pseudo
alternatives by CNP domains of depth n − 1. We specify those pairs of alternatives
derived from different nth order pseudo alternatives that must maintain their rank
differences whenever they are ordered in the same way by two distinct preferences. More
formally, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , qn}, i 6= j we need to define bijections ϕi,j : Xi → Xj
such that x and ϕi,j(x) maintain their rank differences for all x ∈ Xi whenever x is
ranked above ϕi,j(x).
We provide an example of a CNP of depth 3 with q1 = 2, q2 = 3 and q3 = 2 to
illustrate the definition of CNP domains. The first pseudo domain is a cyclical permu-
tation domain defined on two alternatives as shown in Table 3. Next we have to replace
both pseudo alternatives with CNP domains of depth 2 with associated factorizations
2 ·3. We derive these two CNP domains from the second order pseudo alternatives and
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Table 3: Third order pseudo domain
(3)1 (3)2
a1 a2
a2 a1
preferences shown in Table 4. The second order pseudo alternatives b1, . . . , b6 must be
Table 4: Two second order CNP pseudo domains of depth 2
(2)1 (2)2 (2)3
b1 b2 b3
b2 b3 b1
b3 b1 b2
(2)4 (2)5 (2)6
b4 b5 b6
b5 b6 b4
b6 b4 b5
replaced by cyclical permutation domains each defined on two alternatives. We replace
bi with Z (x2i−1  x2i) for all i = 1, . . . , 6. Considering pseudo alternatives b1, b2, b3
and picking bijections ϕ1,2(x1) = x3, ϕ1,2(x2) = x4, ϕ1,3(x1) = x5, ϕ1,3(x2) = x6,
ϕ2,3(x3) = x5, ϕ2,3(x4) = x6, ϕ2,1 = ϕ−11,2, ϕ3,1 = ϕ
−1
1,3, ϕ3,2 = ϕ
−1
2,3, we obtain the
CNP domain shown at the left hand side of Table 5. In an analogous way one obtains
the CNP domain shown at the right hand side of Table 5. Finally, we have to insert
Table 5: Two CNP domains of depth 2 with q1 = 2 and q2 = 3
(1)1 (1)2 (1)3 (1)4 (1)5 (1)6
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
x2 x1 x4 x3 x6 x5
x3 x4 x5 x6 x1 x2
x4 x3 x6 x5 x2 x1
x5 x6 x1 x2 x3 x4
x6 x5 x2 x1 x4 x3
(1)7 (1)8 (1)9 (1)10 (1)11 (1)12
x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12
x8 x7 x10 x9 x12 x11
x9 x10 x11 x12 x7 x8
x10 x9 x12 x11 x8 x7
x11 x12 x7 x8 x9 x10
x12 x11 x8 x7 x10 x9
these two CNP domains of Table 5 into Table 3. To obtain Table 6 we pick bijections
ψ1,2(xi) = xi+6 for all i = 1, . . . , 6 and ψ2,1 = ψ−11,2.
3 Monotonic domains
The following is our main result.
Proposition 1 A rich domain is Borda monotonic if and only if it is a CNP domain.
For the proof of Proposition 1, we need a series of lemmas some of which are
interesting on their own right. If there are k given preferences 1, . . . ,k∈ P and k
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Table 6: A CNP domain of depth 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12
x2 x1 x4 x3 x6 x5 x8 x7 x10 x9 x12 x11
x3 x4 x5 x6 x1 x2 x9 x10 x11 x12 x7 x8
x4 x3 x6 x5 x2 x1 x10 x9 x12 x11 x8 x7
x5 x6 x1 x2 x3 x4 x11 x12 x7 x8 x9 x10
x6 x5 x2 x1 x4 x3 x12 x11 x8 x7 x10 x9
x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
x8 x7 x10 x9 x12 x11 x2 x1 x4 x3 x6 x5
x9 x10 x11 x12 x7 x8 x3 x4 x5 x6 x1 x2
x10 x9 x12 x11 x8 x7 x4 x3 x6 x5 x2 x1
x11 x12 x7 x8 x9 x10 x5 x6 x1 x2 x3 x4
x12 x11 x8 x7 x10 x9 x6 x5 x2 x1 x4 x3
given positive integers n1, . . . , nk, then we shall denote by Π = (n1· 1, . . . , nk· k) a
preference profile in which n1, . . . , nk voters have preferences 1, . . . ,k, respectively.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that P is a rich domain. If there exist two distinct preferences
,′∈ P and two alternatives x, y ∈ X satisfying rk [x,] = 1, rk [y,] = 2 and
d := rk [y,′]− rk [x,′] ≥ 2, then Borda count violates monotonicity on P.
Proof of Lemma 3.1 Let ′′∈ P be a preference with top alternative y, d′ =
rk [x,′′] − rk [y,′′] and k =
⌈
2q+1
d′+1
⌉
.5 We consider the following two profiles of
k(d′+1)−1 individuals: Π = ((kd′−1)· , k· ′′) and Π′ = ((kd′−3)· , 2· ′, k· ′′).
Observe that the Borda score of y is greater than that of x by 1 in profile Π and since y
dominates the remaining alternatives we have fB(Π) = {y}. For profile Π′ the choice
of k assures6 that x and y receive higher Borda scores than any other alternative. Thus,
fB(Π′) = {x} by the assumptions imposed on  and ′. Finally, the precondition of
monotonicity for the alternative x is satisfied as we switch from Π′ to Π, but y becomes
the Borda winning alternative in Π. This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.2 If P is a Borda monotonic rich domain, then for any two preferences in
P having the same top alternative the second ranked alternatives have to be identical.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Suppose that there are preferences,′∈ P such that rk [x,] =
1, rk [y,] = 2, rk [x,′] = 1, rk [z,′] = 2 and y 6= z. Then rk [y,′] > 2 and Lemma
3.1 applies.
Lemma 3.3 If P is a Borda monotonic rich domain, then
pi(x) = {y ∈ X | ∃ ∈ P such that rk[x,] = 1 and rk[y,] = 2}
defines a one-to-one correspondence (permutation) on X.
5In what follows bxc stands for the largest integer not greater than x and dxe stands for the smallest
integer not less than x.
6Any larger integer for k does the job.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3 The statement is obviously true in case of q ≤ 3. Therefore,
we only have to consider the case of q > 3. Suppose that x is ranked first by ∈ P
and ranked second by ′,′′∈ P. We shall denote the top alternatives of ′∈ P and
′′∈ P by y and z, respectively. Any ∗∈ P \{,′,′′} has to rank y or z lower than
x; since otherwise, y and x or z and x violate Lemma 3.1. Hence, P cannot satisfy
part (ii) of the richness condition, a contradiction.
Lemma 3.4 Suppose that P is a Borda monotonic rich domain. Then we cannot find
two distinct preferences ,′∈ P and an alternative y ∈ X such that
• rk [y,] > 2
• U(y,) = U(y,′),
• ∀x ∈ U(y,) : rk [x,] 6= rk [x,′].
Proof of Lemma 3.4 Suppose that there exist two distinct preferences ,′∈ P and
an alternative y ∈ X such that d = rk [y,] > 2, U(y,) = U(y,′) and rk [x,] 6=
rk [x,′] for all x ∈ U(y,). Let ′′∈ P be a preference with top alternative y and
U(y,) = {x1, . . . , xd−1}. Observe that y dominates all alternatives in X \ U(y,)
in all profiles consisting only of preferences ,′ and ′′. We define values dm =
2d− rk [xm,]− rk [xm,′] and d′m = rk [xm,′′]− 1 for all m ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}. Now
let S = argmins∈{1,...,d−1}
d′s
ds
and A = {xs ∈ X | s ∈ S}. For any s ∈ S it can be
verified that a profile consisting of d′s preferences of type , d′s preferences of type ′
and ds preferences of type ′′ makes alternatives {y} ∪ A indifferent on the top. Let
Π = (d′s· , d′s· ′, ds· ′′). Hence, fB(Π) = {y} ∪A.
First, if there exists an s ∈ S such that xs is ranked higher in ′ than in , then
pick an arbitrary alternative xm ∈ A achieving the highest rank increase by replacing
one voter of type  with one voter of type ′. In this case we construct Π′ from Π by
replacing one preference  with one preference ′. It can be checked that y /∈ fB(Π′),
while xm ∈ fB(Π′). Second, if for all s ∈ S we have that xs is ranked higher in
 than in ′, then pick an arbitrary alternative xm ∈ A achieving the highest rank
decrease from  to ′. In this second case we construct Π′ from Π by replacing one
preference ′ with one preference . Again, we have y /∈ fB(Π′), while xm ∈ fB(Π′).
We obtained in both cases a violation of monotonicity at y; a contradiction.
Lemma 3.5 Any CNP domain P on X consists of q preferences and for all x ∈ X,
all i ∈ {1, . . . , q} there exists a preference ∈ P such that rk [x,] = i.
Proof of Lemma 3.5 Following the recursive construction of a CNP domain, we
obtain a pseudo domain of cardinality qn, a pseudo domain of cardinality qnqn−1, and
so on til we obtain a CNP domain of cardinality q. This proves the first part of the
statement.
The second part of the statement can be established by an induction on the depth
of CNP domains. Cyclical permutation domains clearly satisfy our statement. Assume
that our statement holds true for CNP domains of depth n − 1. Take a CNP domain
P of depth n, which has to be constructed from a cyclical permutation domain on nth
order pseudo alternatives and from CNP domains of depth n − 1 replacing the nth
order pseudo alternatives. Employing the induction hypothesis for the CNP domains
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of depth n − 1 and the structure of a cyclical permutation domain (on the nth order
pseudo alternatives), we obtain our statement.
From Lemma 3.5 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 fB(1· 1, . . . , 1· q) = X if P = {1, . . . ,q} is a CNP domain on X.
Lemma 3.6 Let P be a Borda monotonic rich domain, X ′ ⊆ X and P ′ ⊆ P. Assume
that q′ := #X ′ = #P ′ and that the restriction of P ′ to its top q′ alternatives gives a
CNP domain on X ′. Then for any preference ∈ P there exists a preference ′∈ P ′
such that the alternatives from X ′ must follow each other consecutively in the same
order in  as in ′.
Proof of Lemma 3.6 The restriction of P ′ to its top q′ alternatives equals P ′|X′ , which
is a CNP domain on X ′, by the assumptions of Lemma 3.6. We employ an induction
on the depth of the CNP domain on X ′. Lemma 3.1 implies that Lemma 3.6 is satisfied
whenever P ′|X′ is a CNP domain of depth 1.
Assume that the statement holds true for any CNP domain P ′|X′ of depth less than
n. Now let P ′|X′ be a CNP domain of depth n. The nth order pseudo alternatives
generating P ′|X′ , partition X ′ into sets X1, . . . , Xk of cardinality q′/k. Observe that
P ′|Xi are CNP domains of depth n − 1 for all i = 1, . . . , k. Thus, for all preferences
∈ P and all i = 1, . . . , k there exists a preference ′∈ P ′ such that the alternatives
from Xi must follow each other consecutively in the same order in  as in ′ by
our induction hypothesis. Pick an arbitrary preference ∈ P \ P ′ and suppose that
there does not exist a preference ′∈ P ′ such that the alternatives from X ′ must
follow each other consecutively in the same order in  as in ′. Let x1 be the highest
ranked X ′ alternative by . We can assume without loss of generality that x1 ∈
X1. We shall denote by ′∈ P ′ the preference ranking x1 on top. We assume for
notational convenience that ′ ranks Xi above Xi+1 for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Let
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be the largest index such that the alternatives ∪j−1i=1Xi follow each other
consecutively in the same order in  as in ′. We shall denote by xj the highest
ranked Xj alternative in ′ and by ′′∈ P ′ the preference with top alternative xj .
There exists positive integers a and b such that profile Π = (a· ′, b· ′′) has xj and
U ⊆ ∪j−1i=1Xi indifferent on the top. We shall denote by u the lowest ranked alternative
from U by ′. Let d′ = rk [xj ,′]− rk [u,′] and d = rk [xj ,]− rk [u,]. We must
have d′ < d by the definition of j and our induction hypothesis. Let c =
⌈
d′
d−d′
⌉
.
We can assume that a > c, since otherwise, we can take an appropriate multiple of
a and b to have fB(Π) = {xj} ∪ U and a > c. Let Π′ = ((a− 1)· ′, b· ′′) and
Π′′ = (c· , (a− 1− c)· ′, b· ′′). If a and b were chosen large enough so that no
other alternative can interfere, then fB(Π′) = {xj} and u ∈ fB(Π′′), and therefore,
monotonicity is violated at u by switching from Π′′ to Π′.
4 Proof of the Main Result
Proof of Proposition 1 Sufficiency can be shown by employing an induction on
the depth of CNP domains. If P is a CNP domain of depth 1, then P is a simple
cyclic permutation domain. Pick an arbitrary profile Π and any alternative x ∈ f(Π).
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Note that for any cyclic permutation domain L(x,) ⊆ L(x,′) implies for any other
alternative y ∈ X \ {x} either equal rank differences in  and ′ between x and y or
y  x and x ′ y. Thus, x cannot be overtaken by other alternatives if we replace
preferences in Π with other preferences in a way that the precondition of monotoniciy
is satisfied. Thus, a cyclic permutation domain has to be monotonic.
Assume that CNP domains of depth n − 1 are monotonic. Now take an arbitrary
CNP domain P of depth n. We shall denote by Xi the alternatives derived from the
nth order pseudo alternative X(n)i for all i = 1, . . . , qn. By our construction of CNP
domains there are for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , qn} and i 6= j bijections ϕi,j : Xi → Xj such
that x ∈ Xi and ϕi,j(x) maintain their rank differences whenever x is ranked above
ϕi,j(x). Since each instance of an nth order pseudo alternativeX
(n)
i is replaced with the
same CNP domain of depth n− 1, which are monotonic, we can only have a violation
of monotonicity by considering two alternatives derived from two different nth order
pseudo alternatives. Thus, pick two distinct nth order pseudo alternatives X(n)i and
X
(n)
j . Take an arbitrary profile Π such that x ∈ f(Π), where x ∈ Xi. Alternative x
can be overtaken by alternative y ∈ Xj (i 6= j) by replacing preferences in Π without
violating the precondition of monotonicity only if we can find voters of type  in Π
and a preference ′∈ P such that L(x,) ⊆ L(x,′) and either
(a) x  y, x ′ y and rk [y,]− rk [x,] > rk [y,′]− rk [x,′] or
(b) y  x, y ′ x and rk [x,]− rk [y,] < rk [x,′]− rk [y,′].
We only consider case (a) since case (b) can be established in an analogous way. Let
x′ = ϕ−1i,j (y), d = rk [y,]− rk [x′,] = rk [y,′]− rk [x′,′], d1 = rk [y,]− rk [x,]
and d2 = rk [y,′] − rk [x,′]. We cannot have x  x′ and x′ ′ x, since this would
violate L(x,) ⊆ L(x,′). Moreover, x′  x and x ′ x′ cannot be the case, since this
would imply d1 < d < d2, which is in contradiction with d1 > d2. The remaining two
subcases x  x′ and x ′ x′, and x′  x and x′ ′ x would imply the non-monotonicity
of the CNP subdomain of depth n − 1 on Xi by Corollary 1 since each subdomain of
depth n− 1 does also appear on ‘top’ of a subdomain of P; a contradiction.
Now we turn to the necessity of CNP domains. We need the following notations
to prove the necessity of our condition. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ q = #X let |[i,j]
be the restriction of  ranging from the ith position to the jth position of , i.e.,
|[i,j]=|{xi,xi+1,...,xj} where x1  · · ·  xi  · · ·  xj  · · ·  xq. In addition, for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ q, we define P[i,j] =
{|[i,j]|∈ P}. Furthermore, for any linear
ordering  on X ′ ⊆ X we define Ti() = {x ∈ X ′ | rk [x,] ≤ i}) and Mi,j() =
{x ∈ X ′ | i ≤ rk [x,] ≤ j}. We divide our proof into several steps.
Step 1: Lemma 3.3 implies that the top two alternatives determine a permutation
pi of X. The cycles of permutation pi partition X into sets X1, . . . , Xp. We shall denote
by X ′ an arbitrary set Xi (i = 1, . . . , p), by x1, . . . , xm its alternatives and by k∈ P
an arbitrary preference with top alternative xk (k = 1, . . . ,m).7 Clearly, m ≥ 2. Let
P ′ = {1, . . . ,m}. In what follows we can assume without loss of generality that
rk [xk⊕m1,k] = 2.8
7It will turn out that the preference having xk on top is unique.
8For two integers k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if k+ l 6= m and k+ l 6= 2m, we define k⊕m l := (k+ l) mod m,
while if k + l = m or k + l = 2m, we define k ⊕m l := m.
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We determine the top m alternatives of P ′. We must have rk [xk⊕m2,k] = 3 for
all k = 1, . . . ,m by Lemma 3.1. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 3.1 by induction that
rk [xk⊕ml,k] = l + 1 for all l = 1, . . . ,m − 1 and all k = 1, . . . ,m. But this implies
that the top m alternatives of the preferences in P ′ follow the pattern shown in Table
7. Moreover, the restriction to its top m alternatives of any preference in P with a
Table 7: A full cycle on the top
1 2 . . . m−1 m
x1 x2 . . . xm−1 xm
x2 x3 . . . xm x1
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
xm−1 xm . . . xm−3 xm−2
xm x1 . . . xm−2 xm−1
...
...
...
...
top alternative from X ′ equals the restriction to its top m alternatives of a preference
in P ′. In addition, P ′ prescribes the possible orderings of the alternatives from X ′ by
any preference in P by Lemma 3.6.
Clearly, we are finished if p = 1. Hence, in what follows we will assume that p > 1.
Step 2: Let X1, . . . , Xp be a partition of X, mi = #Xi and Pi = {∈ P |
∃x ∈ Xi such that rk [x,] = 1} for all i = 1, . . . , p. Assume that we have already
established that Tmi() = Xi for all ∈ Pi and that P|Xi are CNP domains on Xi for
all i = 1, . . . , p.
We will demonstrate in Step 2 that Borda monotonicity implies the existence of a
set of indices I ⊆ {1, . . . , p} such that #I ≥ 2 and P ′|Y is a CNP domain on Y , where
Y = ∪i∈IXi, P ′ = ∪i∈IPi and T#Y () = Y for all ∈ P ′.9
We can assume without loss of generality that m1 ≤ mi for all i = 1, . . . , p and we
simply write m for m1. Our proof of Step 2 will require three substeps.
Substep A: We claim that there exists an i ∈ {2, . . . , p} such that P1|X1 and Pi|Xi
have identical associated factorizations, and furthermore, Mm+1,2m() = Xi for all
∈ P1. In addition, there exists a bijection ϕ1,i : X1 → Xi such that x ∈ X1 and
ϕ1,i(x) maintain their rank differences in P1. The claim of Substep A implies by
Lemmas 3.4 and 3.6 that P1|Xi = Pi|Xi and m1 = #P1|X1 = #P1|X1∪Xi . We prove our
claim by induction.
Initial step of Substep A: We consider a subdomain P ′ of P1 with a cyclic
permutation domain on top. Note that P ′ = P1 if P1|X1 is a CNP domain of depth 1.
It follows from Lemma 3.4 that there cannot be an alternative x ∈ X that is ranked
by two distinct preferences  and ′ in P ′ at the m + 1th position. We shall denote
the n distinct alternatives ranked mth by the preferences in P ′ by y1, . . . , yn ∈ X,
the corresponding preferences by 1, . . . ,n and the corresponding top alternatives by
9This implies that mi = mj for all i, j ∈ I, that the CNP domains Pi|Xi possess the same factor-
izations mi =
∏k
j=1 qj for all i ∈ I and that the factorization associated with P′|Y is
∏k
j=1 qj ·#I.
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z1, . . . , zn, respectively. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yn} and Z = {z1, . . . , zn}. We can assume
without loss of generality that P ′|Z = Z(∗), where z1 ∗ z2 ∗ . . . ∗ zn.
We show that rk [yk⊕n1,k] = m+2 for all k = 1, . . . n. This assures by Lemma 3.6
that the preferences in P ′ look like in Table 8. For notational convenience we will only
Table 8: Substep A
1 2 . . . n−1 n
z1 z2 . . . zn−1 zn
z2 z3 . . . zn z1
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
...
zn−1 zn . . . zn−3 zn−2
zn z1 . . . zn−2 zn−1
...
...
...
...
y1 y2 . . . yn−1 yn
y2 y3 . . . yn y1
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
...
yn−1 yn . . . yn−3 yn−2
yn y1 . . . yn−2 yn−1
...
...
...
...
show that rk [y2,1] = m+2. We shall denote by ′ a preference with top alternative
y2. Arguing in an even simpler way than in Lemma 3.4, we can find positive integers
a and b such that y2 together with at least another alternative from set X1 receive the
highest Borda scores in profile Π = (a· 2, b· ′) and the lead of y2 over the alternatives
from X1 \ fB(Π) is at least m. Let U ⊆ X1 be the set of those alternatives that are
ranked higher by 1 than by 2.10
Suppose that fB(Π) ∩U 6= ∅. Pick arbitrary alternative u ∈ fB(Π) ∩U 6= ∅. Then
there exists a k ∈ {1, . . . ,m/n} such that rk [u,2] = kn. We shall denote by v ∈ X1
the (k − 1)n + 1th ranked alternative by 2.11 Let d = rk [y2,2] − rk [u,2] and
d′ = rk [u,′]− rk [y2,′]. Since u, y2 ∈ fB(Π), we must have ad = bd′, u ′ v and by
Lemma 3.6 rk [v,′] = d′ + 2. Let us compare the Borda score of v with that of u in
Π. On the one hand v receives a(n − 1) points more than u and on the other hand u
receives b points more than v. Therefore, we must have
a(n− 1) ≤ b⇔ a(n− 1) ≤ a d
d′
⇔ d′(n− 1) ≤ d;
a contradiction, since d < m ≤ d′ and n ≥ 2 by the Assumptions of Step 2. Thus,
fB(Π) ∩ U = ∅.
10From the structure of P1|X1 it follows that rk [u,2] − rk [u,1] = n − 1 for any u ∈ U and
rk [x,1]− rk [x,2] = 1 for any x ∈ X1 \ U .
11Observe that rk [u,1] = (k − 1)n+ 1 and rk [v,1] = (k − 1)n+ 2.
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Let z be the highest ranked alternative from fB(Π) \ {y2} by ′, δ = rk [y2,1]−
rk [y1,1], d = rk [y2,2] − rk [z,2] and d′ = rk [z,′] − rk [y2,′]. Observe that
z has to be the lowest ranked alternative in 2 from set fB(Π) \ {y2}. Suppose that
δ ≥ 2, which would mean that y2 does not follow immediately y1 in 1. We have to
incorporate at least one voter of type1 appropriately in order to obtain a contradiction
with δ ≥ 2. First, we omit a voter of type 2, which makes y2 the single Borda winner
with a lead of d over z. Second, we compensate this lead by replacing c =
⌈
d
δ−1
⌉
voters of type 2 with voters of type 1. If a ≤ c, then by taking an appropriate
multiple of Π, we can ensure that we have more voters of type 2 than c. Hence, we
can assume a > c without loss of generality. Third, we have to take care about not
making an alternative u ∈ U the Borda winning alternative. If z does not lead by cn
over alternatives u ∈ U in Π, then this can be guaranteed by starting already with an
appropriate multiple of Π.12 Again, we can assume without loss of generality that a
and b satisfy this latter requirement. Finally, let Π′ = (c· 1, (a − c − 1)· 2, b· ′)
and Π′′ = ((a− 1)· 2, b· ′). It can be verified that monotonicity is violated at z by
switching from Π′ to Π′′, since z ∈ fB(Π′) and {y2} = fB(Π′′). Thus, we must have
δ = 1.
Induction hypotheses of Substep A: Assume that we have already obtained
a partition P1,1, . . . ,P1,t of P1, disjoint subdomains P2,1, . . . ,P2,t ⊆ P \ P1 with
respective top n = mt alternatives X
j,i (j = 1, 2 and i = 1, . . . , t) such that t ≥ 2, n =
#P1,i[1,n] = #P2,i[1,n], P1,i[m+1,m+n] = P2,i[1,n] are CNP domains with associated factorizations
n = q1·. . .·ql for all i = 1, . . . , t and there exist bijections ϕ : X1,i → X2,i satisfying that
x and ϕi(x) maintain their rank differences in P1,i for all x ∈ X1,i and all i = 1, . . . , t.13
This implies that the factorization associated with P1 equals q1 · . . . ·ql · . . . ·ql′ for some
l′ and ql+1, . . . , ql′ .
Induction step of Substep A: Let r = ql+1, h = t/r and Pj,i = {j,i1 , . . . ,j,it }
for all j = 1, 2 and all i = 1, . . . , t. We shall denote by Xj,i the set of top alternatives
of Pj,i. Hence, if we denote the lth order pseudo alternatives of P1|X1 by X1,1, . . . , X1,t,
then the first r pseudo preferences of the pseudo domain associated with P1|X1 look like
in Table 9 supposed that we have labeled the sets X1,i appropriately. In what follows
we shall focus, for notational convenience, on P1,1 and P1,2. In addition, we can assume
without loss of generality that the alternatives and preferences are labeled in a way
that rk
[
x1,in ,1,2k
]
= (i− 2)n+ 1 + (n− k) for all k = 1, . . . , n and all i = 2, . . . , t for
which i−1 is not divisible by r, and otherwise, rk
[
x1,in ,1,2k
]
= (i+r−2)n+1+(n−k)
for all k = 1, . . . , n and all i = 1, . . . , t.
We shall denote by y1, . . . , yn the n distinct alternatives ranked m + 1th by the
preferences 1,21 , . . . ,1,2n , respectively. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yn}. Moreover, for all i =
1, . . . , n we simply write i, ′i and ′′i for 1,1i , 1,2i and 2,2i , respectively.
We can find positive integers a and b such that Y and at least a set of alternatives
X ′ ⊆ X1 receives the highest Borda score in profile Π = (a· ′1, . . . , a· ′n, b· ′′1
, . . . , b· ′′n). Let U ⊆ X1 be the set of those alternatives that are ranked higher by 1
than by ′1. Observe that U = ∪h−1i=0X1,ir+1.
12More precisely, we should have first defined c =
⌈
d
δ−1
⌉
and a, b afterwards. However, we have
followed a different order for expositional reasons.
13Our initial step assured the existence of a partition with l = 1.
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Table 9: Pseudo domain on top
P1,1 P1,2 . . . P1,r
X1,1 X1,2 . . . X1,r
X1,2 X1,3 . . . X1,1
...
...
...
X1,r X1,1 . . . X1,r−1
...
...
...
X1,t−r+1 X1,t−r+2 . . . X1,t
X1,t−r+2 X1,t−r+3 . . . X1,t−r+1
...
...
...
X1,t X1,t−r+1 . . . X1,t−1
...
...
...
Suppose that there exists an i = 1, . . . , h such that u ∈ fB(Π)∩X1,(i−1)r+1. Pick an
arbitrary alternative y ∈ Y . Since {u, y} ∈ fB(Π), we must have a[(h−i)r+1]n2 = bd′,
where d′ =
∑n
i=1 rk [u,′′i ] − rk [y,′′i ]. Take an alternative v from X1,(i−1)r+2 such
that d′′ =
∑n
i=1 rk [v,′′i ] − rk [y,′′i ] is as small as possible. Since the Borda score
of v cannot be greater than that of u in Π, we must have an(r − 1)n ≤ b (d′′ − d′).
Therefore,
bd′
[(h− i)r + 1]n2n
2(r − 1) ≤ b (d′′ − d′)⇔ d′(r − 1) ≤ (d′′ − d′) [(h− i)r + 1]. (4.1)
By the induction hypothesis of Step 2 and by Lemmas 3.4 and 3.6 we must have
d′ ≥ mn = tn2. The value d′′−d′ would be the largest if u is ranked higher than v by any
preference ′′i ∈ P2,2. Then the alternatives from X1,(i−1)r+2 must follow immediately
the alternatives from X1,(i−1)r+1 in any ′′i ∈ P2,2 by Lemma 3.6. Moreover, we have
d′′ − d′ ≤ n2 by Lemma 3.6 and by the choice of v, which together with equation (4.1)
implies
tn2 ≤ d′(r − 1) ≤ (d′′ − d′) [(h− i)r + 1] ≤ n2[(h− i)r + 1].
It follows from these inequalities that rh = t ≤ [(h − i)r + 1], which implies ir ≤ 1.
Therefore, since r, n ≥ 2, h ≥ 1 and i ≥ 1 we obtained a contradiction and we conclude
that fB(Π) ∩ U = ∅.
Define v = max{i = 1, . . . , t | X1,i ∩ fB(Π) 6= ∅} and pick an alternative z from
X1,v ∩ fB(Π). Let ′∈ P1,2 the preference that ranks z highest. For notational
convenience we can assume that ′=′n and ′ ranks yn as the highest alternative from
Y .14 Hence, z is the highest ranked alternative fromX1,v by ′n. Observe that from the
way how we labeled the alternatives of X1 and our assumption on ϕ : X1,2 → X2,2 = Y
it follows that rk [yn,′k]− rk
[
x1,2n ,′k
]
= m for all k = 1, . . . , n. In addition, we can
assume for notational convenience that k|X1,v=′k|X1,v for all k = 1, . . . , n. We will
show that rk [yn,k] = m + n + 1 + (n − k) for all k = 1, . . . , n. Observe that
rk [yn,k] > m + n, since the shortest sequence of alternatives that must follow an
14Otherwise, we would relabel the alternatives of X1 and Y as well as the preferences of P1,2.
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already prescribed order is of length n and by Lemma 3.4 none of the alternatives
of Y can be ranked m + 1th by a preference of P1,1. Now take an arbitrary index
k = 1, . . . , n and let δk = rk [yn,k]− (m+ 1 + n− k).
Suppose that δk > n. By replacing a preference ′1 with ′n, we can achieve that
fB(Π) contains only yn from Y and only z from X1,v. In what follows we shall denote
this modified profile by Π with a slight abuse of notation. Let d = rk [yn,′n]−rk [z,′n]
and d′ =
∑n
i=1 rk [z,′′i ]− rk [yn,′′i ]. Note that d′ ≥ mn by the assumptions of Step
2 and by Lemmas 3.4 and 3.6. Now we have to incorporate at least one voter of type
k into Π in order to obtain a contradiction with δk > n. First, we omit a voter of
type ′1, which makes yn the single Borda winner with a lead of d over z. Second, we
compensate this lead by replacing c =
⌈
d
δk−n
⌉
voters of type ′k with voters of type
k. If a ≤ c, then by starting with an appropriate multiple of Π, we can ensure that
we have more than c voters of type ′k. Hence, we can assume a > c without loss of
generality. Third, we have to take care about not making an alternative u ∈ U the
Borda winning alternative. If z does not lead by cm over alternatives u ∈ U in Π, then
this can be guaranteed by starting already with an appropriate multiple of Π.15 Thus,
we can assume without loss of generality that a and b satisfy this latter requirement.
Let Π′ = (c· k, (a − 2)· ′1, a· ′2, . . . , a· ′k−1, (a − c)· ′k, a· ′k+1, . . . , a· ′n−1
, (a + 1)· ′n, b· ′′1 , . . . , b· ′′n) and Π′′ = ((a − 2)· ′1, a· ′2, . . . , a· ′n−1, (a + 1)· ′n
, b· ′′1 , . . . , b· ′′n). It can be verified that monotonicity is violated at z by switching
from Π′ to Π′′, since {z} = fB(Π′) and {yn} = fB(Π′′). Thus, we cannot have δk > n.
Suppose that δk < n for some k. Then alternative yn has to be ranked by at least
two different preferences of P1,1 at the same position, since δk ≤ n for all i = 1, . . . , n.
However, this is in contradiction with Lemmas 3.4 and 3.6. Hence, we must have δk = n
for all k = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, since the shortest sequence of alternatives that must follow an already
prescribed order is of length n and by Lemma 3.6 none of the alternatives of Y can
be ranked m + 1th by a preference of P1,1, we obtained that n = #P1,2|X1∪Y and
P1,1[m+n+1,m+2n] = P2,2[1,n]. Thus, the pseudo domain of Table 9 extends to a pseudo
domain as illustrated in Table 10. Now Lemma 3.6 implies that the alternatives ∪ri=1Yi
must form a CNP domain of depth l + 1 with an associated factorization
∏l+1
i=1 qi.
Therefore, our induction works and the induction hypothesis is true for depth l + 1.
Arriving to l′, we see that the claim of Substep A is true, since it follows from Lemma
3.6 that there exists an i = 2, . . . , p for which P2,1, . . . ,P2,t partitions Pi.
Substep B: Substep A implies that there exists an I ⊆ {1, . . . , p} such that for all
i ∈ I the subdomains Pi|Xi have all identical factorizations, there exists a j ∈ I \ {i}
for which Mm+1,2m() = Xj for all ∈ Pi and there exists a bijection ϕi,j : Xi → Xj
such that x ∈ Xi and ϕi,j(x) maintain their rank differences in Pi. We shall assume
for notational convenience that I = {1, . . . , r}. Hence, there exists a σ : {1, . . . , r} →
{1, . . . , r} telling us, which set Xσ(i) of alternatives must follow immediately the top
set Xi of alternatives for all i = 1, . . . , r. In Substep B we demonstrate that σ is a
bijection. This is clearly the case if r = 2.
Thus, we can assume that r > 2. Our proof will be similar to that of Lemmas
3.1-3.3, but we have to replace the alternatives appearing in those proofs with “nested
15More precisely, we should have first defined c =
⌈
d
δk−n
⌉
and a, b afterwards. Again, we have
followed a different order for expositional reasons.
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Table 10: Extended pseudo domain
P1,1 P1,2 . . . P1,r
X1,1 X1,2 . . . X1,r
X1,2 X1,3 . . . X1,1
...
...
...
X1,r X1,1 . . . X1,r−1
...
...
...
X1,t−r+1 X1,t−r+2 . . . X1,t
X1,t−r+2 X1,t−r+3 . . . X1,t−r+1
...
...
...
X1,t X1,t−r+1 . . . X1,t−1
Y1 Y2 . . . Yr
Y2 Y3 . . . Y1
...
...
...
cycles”, which will complicate the argument.
Suppose that σ does not define a bijection. Then there exists i, i′, i′′ ∈ {1, . . . r}
such that i 6= i′, i 6= i′′, i′ 6= i′′, σ(i′) = i and σ(i′′) = i. Moreover, m = mi =
mi′ = mi′′ by Substep A. For notational convenience let X ′ = {x1, . . . , xm} = Xi, Y =
{y1, . . . , ym} = Xi′ , Z = {z1, . . . , zm} = Xi′′ such that ϕi′,i(yl) = xl and ϕi′′,i(zl) = xl
for all l = 1, . . . ,m. Pick preferences 1, . . . ,m,′1, . . . ,′m,′′1 , . . . ,′′m∈ P with
respective top alternatives x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym, z1, . . . , zm. If r = 3, then the alter-
natives from X ′ cannot be lowest ranked alternatives; a contradiction. If r > 3, then
we can assume the existence of a preference ∈ P in which the alternatives from Y are
ranked above the alternatives from Z and the alternatives from Z are ranked above the
alternatives from X ′ by part (ii) of the richness condition. For notational convenience
we can assume that
yl ′l . . . ′l yl′ ′l x1 ′l . . . ′l xm ′l . . .
zk ′′k . . . ′′k zk′ ′′k x1 ′′k . . . ′′k xm ′′k . . .
and
. . .  ys  . . .  ys′  . . .  zt  . . .  zt′  . . .  x1  . . .  xm
for some l, l′, k, k′, s, s′, t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Let J = argminj∈{1,...,m}
∑m
u=1 rk [yj ,u] and Y ′ = {yj ∈ Y | j ∈ J}. Then there
exist positive integers a and b such that b > m2 + 1 and that profile
Π = (a· 1, . . . , a· m, b· ′1, . . . , b· ′m) ,
has alternatives Y ′ ∪X ′ indifferent on top with a lead of at least (m2 + 1)q over the
alternatives from X \ (X ′ ∪ Y ). We consider profile
Π′ = (a· 1, . . . , a· m, (b− 1)· ′1, . . . , (b− 1)· ′m) ,
in which the top alternatives X ′ have a lead of m2 over alternatives Y ′. To obtain Π′′
from Π′ we replace m2 + 1 preferences of type ′s with m2 + 1 preferences of type .
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It can be verified that fB(Π′) = X ′ and fB(Π′′) = Y ′. Thus, we have a violation of
monotonicity at any alternative y ∈ Y ′ if we switch from Π′′ to Π′.
Substep C: Substep B established that the cycles of permutation σ partition
{1, . . . , r} into sets I1, . . . , Is. In what follows we consider, for notational convenience,
the case of I = I1 = {1, . . . , k} and σ(1) = 2, . . . , σ(k − 1) = k, σ(k) = 1. First, in
an analogous way to Step 1 we show in Substep C that the cycles formed by alterna-
tives X1, . . . , Xk follow each other in a cyclic pattern in P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk; that is, for all
i = 1, . . . , k we have in Pi that the alternatives from Xi⊕k1 follow those from Xi, the
alternatives from Xi⊕k2 follow those from Xi⊕k1, and so on. Second, we claim that
there exist bijections τi,j : Xi → Xj (i, j = 1, . . . , k) such that
[x ∈ Xi, v = τi,j(x), x  v, x ′ v]⇒ rk [v,]− rk [x,] = rk [v,′]− rk [x,′] (4.2)
for all ,′∈ P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk and all i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , k.
Clearly, both claims are true for the case of k ≤ 2. Hence, we can assume that
k ≥ 3. We know by Substep B that the first claim of Substep C is true for the top 2m
alternatives of any preferences in Pi and that we can define bijections τi,i⊕k1 : Xi →
Xi⊕k1 in a way that equation (4.2) holds true for all i = 1, . . . , k if we restrict ourselves
to the top 2m alternatives of P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk.
Our induction hypotheses is that the claim holds true for the top lm alternatives,
where l ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, of any preference in P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk.16 For purely notational
convenience let Y = {y1, . . . , ym} = Xl, Z = {z1, . . . , zm} = Xl+1, and τl,l+1(yi) = zi
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. We will just consider the case of z1. The other elements of Z
can be handled in the same way. We shall denote by ∈ P1 the preference that ranks
y1 as the highest ranked Y alternative; i.e., rk [y1,] = m(l − 1) + 1. Moreover, let
′ be a preference ranking y1 on the top and let ′′ be a preference ranking z1 on
the top. There exists positive integers a and b such that profile Π = (a· ′, b· ′′) has
alternatives z1 and Y ′ ⊆ Y on the top. Let ys = max{t ∈ {1, . . . , j} | ys ∈ Y ′}.
Suppose that alternative z1 does not immediately follow ym in ; i.e, rk [z1,] >
ml + 1. Let δ = rk [z1,] − (ml + 1), d = rk [z1,′] − rk [ys,′] and c =
⌈
d
δ
⌉
. Then
considering profiles Π′ = ((a− 1)· ′, b· ′′) and Π′ = (c· , (a− c− 1)· ′, b· ′′), we
can verify that ys ∈ fB(Π′′) and fB(Π′) = {z1} if a and b were selected large enough
so that no other alternative can interfere and a > c+ 1. Monotonicity is now violated
at ys if we switch from Π′′ to Π′.
It follows from the above defined τl,l+1 : Xl → Xl+1, τ1,l : X1 → Xl and transitivity
that we obtained a bijection τ1,l+1 : X1 → Xl+1 in a way that equation (4.2) holds
true for all l = 1, . . . , k − 1 if we restrict ourselves to the top (l + 1)m alternatives of
P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk. One can obtain the remaining bijections in an analogous way.
We conclude that we have constructed the required sets Y = ∪ki=1Xi and P ′ =
∪ki=1Pi by induction.
Step 3: The partition X1, . . . , Xp of X in Step 1 satisfies the requirements of Step
2. Finally, it follows by induction from Step 2 that P has to be a CNP domain.
16This includes that we have defined bijections τi,i⊕kl−1 : Xi → Xi⊕kl−1 in a way that equation
(4.2) holds true for all i = 1, . . . , k if we restrict ourselves to the top lm alternatives of P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk.
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